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1. Introduction
The Kolm triangle is the analogue of the Edgeworth box for an
economy with two agents, one private good and one pure public
good. It was first introduced in the literature by Malinvaud (1971)
who refers to unpublished manuscripts by S.Ch. Kolm. Schlesinger
(1989) describes it in some detail and illustrates its use in analyzing
Lindahl and Nash equilibria.
Despite its potential, the Kolm triangle hardly appears in the
literature. A search made on the March 1993 EconLit disc (cov-
ering the Journal of Economic Literature since 1969) for entries
containing 'Kolm' and 'triangle' returned only Schlesinger (1989).
Laffont (1988)'s textbook displays a few diagrams of this tool, but
he just barely refers to them in the text.
In this paper, we provide simple geometrical proofs of various
results from the public-goods literature using the Kolm triangle.
We also use it to present a new result concerning the subsidization
of private contributions. We want to show that the Kolm triangle
is a powerful tool for analyzing public-goods problems.
Our reference framework will be the model of private contri-
butions to public goods used by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian
(1986). With the Kolm triangle, we can easily study the existence
and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, the effects of redistribution of
the initial wealth, the level of provision in Stackelberg equilibria,
and the effects of subsidizing private contributions.
2. The Model
We have two agents, i = 1,2, each of whom consumes one private
good, xi, and one shared public good, G. Agent i has a preference
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ordering over the pairs (xi, G) that can be represented by a quasi-
concave utility function, Ui(xi, G). We assume that the public good
can be produced at a constant marginal cost. Choosing a suitable
choice of units, we can then normalize all prices to be 1. Finally,
let (w1 , W2) be the agents' initial endowments of private goods.
The agents choose their private contributions, gi, to the public
good. The total amount of public good provided is determined by
the sum of the individual contributions, G = 91 + 92. Each agent
i solves
max U(xi,g+ 92)
s.t. X +9i = w=
Xi,9 ;> 0.
We can use the budget constraint to eliminate xi and write the
individual's optimization problem more compactly as
max Ui(w, -g,gi +g92)
9' (1)
s.t. 0<g1;<w i .
A more general version of this model, with any number of agents,
has been extensively studied by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian
(1986).
3. The Kolm Triangle
Figure 1 shows a Kolm triangle for our model economy. The height
of the triangle is given by the total amount of resources available,
w1 + w2. Since the sum of the distances to the sides is constant
and equals the height of the triangle, then, for any point inside the
triangle, we have
x1 +2 + G = w1 -+W2.
Therefore, any point inside the triangle is associated with a feasible
allocation. In any allocation, z, agent i's private consumption is
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given by the distance from z to 0,00. The amount of public good,
G, associated with z is simply given by the distance from z to the
base of the triangle, 0102.
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Figure 1. A feasible allocation in a Kolm triangle.
In figure 2 we represent the agents' indifference maps. We start
from a given allocation, z. Any other allocation in the set B must
be better than z for agent one since in B she gets more of both
goods than in z. In W, on the other hand, agent one gets less
from both goods so she must be worse off. The direction of the
preferences is shown in figure 2. Agent i's indifference curves are
convex to his origin, 0,, whenever his preferences are quasiconcave.
Since along 0102 we have that G = 0, then any point along
0102 is associated with an initial allocation, w. If we normalize
the length of 0102 to be 1, then the distance of w from 01 will be
Figure 2. The indifference maps in a Kolm triangle.
given by w1 /(w1 + W2).
4. Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium in this model is a vector of contributions (gi, g2)
which solves the two agents' following optimization programs:
max Ui(wi -gi,gi +g)
s.t. 0 g1 5 wj
and max U 2(w2 -9 2,gi +92)
s.t. 0 <92 < w 2.
Figure 3 shows a Nash equilibrium, denoted by E. Let A =
(Wi, W2) represent the initial allocation. When 92 = 0, agent one's
opportunity locus is given by the segment AC which is parallel
to 0 20 0 -i.e., along AC we have that X2 = w2 . When agent
two is contributing 92 = g2 = A'J, agent one's opportunity locus
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shifts to A'C'. At the Nash equilibrium, E, agent one is optimized
on his 'budget line' A'C' where she contributes 91 = gi = A"I.
(She consumes EH = wi - gi of the private good.) When agent
one contributes g[, agent two's opportunity locus shifts from AB
(where 91 = 0) to A"B". (Note that AB and A'B' are parallel to
0100.) In A"B", agent two's most preferred point is E, where he
contributes g. Since the agents' indifference curves cross through
E, the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. (A Pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium is a possibility only at the endowment point, A.)
cA 0
D , g ( '):
;10) :g:g
O1 'A 02
Figure 4. Agent one's reaction function.
g = 92(91).
We can represent agent one's reaction function in a Kolm tri-
angle, see figure 4. Again, let A = (w1 UW2) represent the initial
allocation. When 92 = 0, agent one's opportunity locus is given by
the segment AC. Given this constraint, agent one would choose to
contribute 91(0). When 92 = g', the opportunity locus will shift
to A'C', and agent one will choose 91(9') for a total amount of G
given by g(g') + g'. When 92 9", we have that 91(92) = 0.
If both goods are normal goods, the reaction function 91(92)
cannot be steeper than 0100 (since that would imply a smaller
demand of X1 as income increases) and it cannot be flatter than
0102 (since that would imply a smaller demand of G as income
increases). As a result, once agent one's reaction function hits
0, I IA
Figure 3. A Nash equilibrium.
Let's denote by 91(92) and 92(91) agent one's and agent two's
optimal solutions to (1) as functions of the other agent's gift. Thus,
91(92) and 92(91) are the agents' reaction functions. Then, if
(9iX9) is a Nash equilibrium, we must have gi = g1(g), and
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AB it has to stay in AB since AB is parallel to 0 1 0 0-of course,
the reaction function 91(92) doesn't need to ever hit AB. Said
another way, once agent one contributes nothing to the public good,
bigger contributions by agent two will only induce agent one to keep
contributing nothing. The curve DB in figure 4 represents agent
one's reaction function. (A similar derivation for agent two will
tell us that 92(91) has to be flatter than 0200 and steeper than
0102.)
4.1. Existence of Nash Equilibrium
Given an initial distribution of wealth, we can plot 91(92) and
92(91). The existence of Nash equilibrium (Theorem 2 in Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian (1986)) will be proved if we can show that the
graphs of the reaction functions cross inside the triangle. Refer
to figure 5. We have that 91(92) must start out somewhere in
AC and must reach the segment B0 0 . Agent two's reaction func-
tion, 92(9i), must go from AB to COO. Both reaction functions
must always stay inside the romboid ACOoB, and by the assump-
tions made about the preferences, they both have unbroken graphs.
Thus, the existence of Nash equilibrium is established.
4.2. Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
Theorem 3 in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) says that "there
is a unique Nash equilibrium with a unique quantity of public good
and a unique set of contributing consumers." Here the uniqueness
follows from the bounds imposed by the strict normality assump-
tion (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), page 32) on the slope
of the reaction functions. The first panel in figure 5 shows a unique
Nash equilibrium. The second panel gives an example of multiple
equilibria when G is an inferior good.
00 00
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Figure 5. Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium.
5. Redistribution of Income
Warr (1983) discovered an interesting neutrality theorem that was
later extended by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). Assume
that we have a Nash equilibrium, (gi, g;). If income is redistributed
among contributing consumers in such a way that none of them
loses more income than his original distribution, then there is a new
Nash equilibrium, (g[*,g*), where 91*+* = g *+g, and x* =
xi = wi - g . That is, the same amount of public good is provided
and each agent consumes the same amount of private goods that in
the original equilibrium-i.e., every consumer changes the amount
of his gift by precisely the amount of the income transfer.
Figure 6 shows the effect of a redistribution of income from agent
one to agent two that shifts the initial point from A to A'. The
diagram shows the agents' reaction functions whose intersection
determines the Nash equilibrium E. The portion of 91(92) between
AC and A'C' is no longer relevant after the redistribution. On
the other hand, agent two's reaction function, 92(91), gains an
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Figure 6. Redistribution of Income.
additional portion between AB and A'B' after the redistribution.
However, the old Nash equilibrium is the Nash equilibrum of the
new game. The agents' consumptions remain unchanged.
Figure 7 shows the bounds on income redistribution. In A' we
have taken away from agent two an amount of income equal to his
gift in the initial Nash equilibrium. This is the maximum amount
that we can take away from him and still get the same equilibrium
level of public good and private consumptions. The maximum
redistribution from agent one to agent two-that will leave the
equilibrium amount of G and (xi, x2) unchanged-will move the
endowment to A".
Figure 7. Bounds on the income redistribution.
6. Stackelberg Equilibrium
,Varian (1993) studies sequential contributions to public goods. The
Kolm triangle is a useful tool to gain further insights into his re-
sults. Let agent one be the leader and agent two be the follower.
Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium will be determined by agent one
choosing her most preferred point in agent two's reaction function.
That is, agent one solves
max Ui(wi - 91,91 +92(91))
s.t. 0<91<w1.
where 92(91) is agent two's reaction function-i.e., the solution to
(1) for agent two.
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Varian (1993)'s main result (theorem 2) states that the leader's
contribution at the Stackelberg equilibrium is bounded above by
her contribution at the Nash equilibrium. As a corollary, the total
amount of the public good in the Stackelberg equilibrium is never
bigger than the total amount provided in the Nash equilibrium.
Figure 8 shows these results.
this movement necessarily implies less G in the Stackelberg equi-
librium (Varian (1993), corollary to theorem 3). We can also easily
see why agent one's contribution at the Stackelberg equilibrium can
be no larger than her contribution at the Nash equilibrium. Since
the Stackelberg equilibrium cannot lie to the left of the Nash equi-
librium, it implies that agent one's contribution will be smaller. In
figure 8, agent one contributes g[ = DI at the Nash equilibrium
and gf = JH at the Stackelberg equilibrium.
7. Subsidizing Contributions
Back in a Nash model, Roberts (1987) discovered the puzzling re-
sult that rich people might be made worse off when their contribu-
tions are subsidized at a higher rate than poor people--i.e., when
the contributions are tax-deductible in a system of progressive in-
come taxation. This issue has been examined by Bergstrom (1989)
who shows that if we have two identical individuals contributing to
a public good, each will prefer to face a price higher than the price
faced by the other individual.1 In Roberts (1987) and Bergstrom
(1989) the subsidy is paid by a lump-sum tax on both agents. Var-
ian (1993) shows that each agent will prefer to subsidize the other
agent even if he must pay the entire amount of the subsidy himself.
In Varian's model, agents have quasi-linear utility functions.
1 There is a small problem in Bergstrom (1989)'s argument in page 172 where
he writes: "But since both are consuming the same amount of public good and
since we have assumed disminishing marginal rate of substitution, the only
way this can happen is that Plato has more private good than Aristotle." The
concavity of the utility function only implies that the marginal rate of substi-
tution disminishes along a given indiference curve and in the argument, both
individuals end up at different utility levels. It is possible to construct a coun-
terexample where Aristotle is better off than Plato after receiving the subsidy.
However, assuming that the public good is a normal good then Bergstrom's
claim holds true. In that case, holding the amount of public good fixed, a
smaller marginal rate of substitution must necessarily imply a higher utility
level.
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Figure 8. Stackelberg equilibrium: Agent one is leader.
Figure 8 shows Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. The Nash equi-
librium, E, is determined by the crossing of the reaction functions.
The Stackelberg equilibrium, F, is given by agent one's most pre-
ferred point in agent two's reaction function. We have drawn agent
one's indifference curves through those equilibria. Looking at the
indifference curve through E, we see that agent one will move to
points of 92(91) to the right of E. Since 92(91) has a negative slope,
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We shall show that for two non-identical individuals with general
quasi-concave utility functions, when both goods are normal, an
agent will always want to subsidize the other agent's contributions
even if he must pay the entire amount of the subsidy himself. We
only analyze here the case where we have interior Nash equilibria
before the subsidy.
In the subsidy game, agent one will subsidize agent two at the
rate s in (0, 1). Agent two solves
max U2(w2 - (1 - s)92, gi + 92)
92
s.t. 0_ <( 1-3s) 92<5W 2.
subsidy rate, s, such that agent one-who pays the subsidy-is
better off at the resulting Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
Ui(w1 -sg2(s)-g*(s),9*(s)+92(s)) > Ui(wi -9(0),9i*(0)+9*(0)).
Further, agent two-who is being subsidized-is worse off than
before the subsidy, i.e.,
U2 (w2 - (1 - s)* (s), 91* (s) + 9(s)) < U2 (w1 - g2 (0), 9i*(0) +9* (0)) .
and agent one's problem is 7.1. The Geometry of 
a Subsidy
max U2 (w1-T-gi, 1 + 92 )91
s.t. 0< 9 1 <w 1 -T.
where T = sg2. Given the subsidy rate, s, a Nash equilibrium is a
vector of contributions (g[(s), g(s)) which solves both agent one's
problem,
max Ui(wi - sg4(s) - 91,9i + g*(s))
91
s.t. O<gi <wi1- sg*(s)
and agent two's problem,
max U2(w2 - (1 - s)92,9 *(s) + 92)
92
s.t. 0 < (1 - s)92 < w2.
We claim that-provided that both agents are contributing at
the initial Nash equilibrium where s = 0-there always exists a
.101 (e I- ,
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Figure 9. The Geometry of a Subsidy.
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Figure 9 shows the geometry of a subsidy. The subsidy c
slope of agent two's opportunity locii. In particular, if a
the angle, in radians, of AB' with respect to 0102, then
sin(a - x/3)
sin a
When a = x/3 so that AB' is parallel to 0100, then s =
other extreme, when a = 2x/3 so that AB' is parallel to
s = 1. Since agent one has to pay for the subsidy, her o
locii will be also affected. In figure 9, when 92 = A'D,
has to pay T = s92 = A'D - FH. This shifts her opportu
to A'C'.














Figure 10 shows the effects of a subsidy from agent one to agent
two. We display the initial Nash equilibrium, E, where the agents'
reaction functions cross. We have also represented the agents' in-
difference curves through E. When agent one subsidizes agent two,
agent two's new reaction function has to be above his old reaction
function. At the new equilibrium, F, agent one is clearly better off
than at E. What about agent two? Since the slope of agent two's
indifference curve through E is parallel to 0100 which is the upper
bound for the slope of agent one's reaction function, 91(92), it fol-
lows that F must lie below agent two's indifference curve through
F.
7.3. Corner Solutions
If agent two was not contributing towards the public good at the
initial Nash equilibrium, the same results hold provided that there
is a subsidy that induces him to contribute a positive amount.
The other corner solution, where agent one was not contributing
initially, can lead to anything. It may or may not be possible to
improve agent one's welfare with the subsidy; and, in either case,
agent two might end up better or worse off.
8. Conclusion
We have used the Kolm triangle to show various results from the lit-
erature that deals with private contributions to pure public goods.
The geometrical proofs are quite simple and very useful to develop
the intuition behind the results.
We have also generalized a result concerning the subsidization of
the private contributions using this graphical tool. We have showed
that for two non-identical individuals with general quasi-concave
02 utility functions, when both goods are normal, an agent will gen-
erally want to subsidize the other agent's contributions even if she
must pay the entire amount of the subsidy himself. Only when an
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agent perceived that there was 'too much' public good initially-
i.e., she is at a corner solution contributing nothing-, she might
not be better off subsidizing the other agent's contribution.
We conclude that the Kolm triangle is a powerful tool that can
be productively used as a research and pedagogic device in public-
goods problems.
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